Weapons and the Never Ending Space Race
DANIEL A.PORRAS
Nearly every article on 'space security' begins with the
acknowledgement that satellites and space-based services are critical for
modern societies. And with good reason.
Space technologies provide tools that enable worldwide
communications, remote sensing and global navigation. Even militaries are
highly dependent on data and services from satellites, providing intelligence,
missile guidance and early-warning detection.
Whether it be the US, Russia, China, or any other major
military force, all employ space capabilities to some extent.
As a result of this dependence, some militaries are
developing the tools to deny their adversaries the use and benefit of space
systems. These capabilities come in several different categories, but they all
share one common feature: they are threats to space systems. This is not
unexpected.
Much the same as aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons, it was only a matter of
time before military actors began developing the means to neutralise advantages
gained from space.
Yet while this technology has previously been limited to a few players, new
innovations in asymmetric warfare are quickly changing the dynamics of what
might be conflict in space.
Moreover, there is a very small possibility (and it is highly remote) that some
capabilities be put in space that can target objects in the atmosphere or on
the surface of the Earth. These weapon systems would represent a threat from
space systems.
As unlikely as this possibility might be, it is sufficiently real for some
states who see counterspace weapons as possible insurance against attempts at 'dominance' in outer space.
The Secure World Foundation (SWF) - a think-tank based in Washington, DC - maintains a global counterspace capabilities assessment. This open-source
document uses publicly available information to show which countries are
developing what capabilities.
The principal actors pursuing such capabilities are the US, Russia, China and
India. While the assessment includes a few other outliers that might have the
building blocks for counterspace capabilities (i.e. Israel, Iran, Pakistan,
North Korea), recent events indicate that there are more countries now actively
seeking 'weapons in space', including Franceand Japan.
There are four main types of counterspace capabilities. The first is 'kinetic',
namely those that use physical force to cause damage to a satellite. This
includes anti-satellite missiles (like the one recently used by India) or even
co-orbital drones. These drones are highly manoeuvrable craft that can repair,
refuel or even remove satellites from orbit. Such tools can be used for
beneficial purposes, like debris removal, or possibly to attack satellites.
The second type of counterspace capability is 'non-kinetic', which use
high-powered energy to cause disruption or damage to satellites. At present,
several countries are developing lasers that could be used in this way,
including the US, Russia, China and France.
In the 1980s, then-US President Ronald Reagan launched an initiative called
Star Wars, which consisted of satellites with missile interceptors that could
destroy ICBMs in orbit.
The main problem with kinetic and non-kinetic weapons is that when they damage
or destroy a satellite, they also create debris, which does not necessarily
come back down to Earth right away. As one expert once told me, it is like
having a war in which the bullets never stop flying.
The other two categories of capabilities are less destructive but are much more
prevalent. Electronic counterspace capabilities, which includes jamming and
spoofing, is easily accessible to many actors, including non-state actors. The
same can be said for cyber capabilities, which can be deployed for espionage,
surveillance, or even destruction of space systems.
One of the major concerns with these two categories of capabilities is that
there is no consensus around when 'interference' becomes an attack. This is
particularly worrying as NATO just announced plans to declare that an 'attack' on a satellite is enough to trigger collective self-defence. There is no
indication whether there is consensus among NATO members as to what is
considered an attack on a space object, nor whether that same view is shared
with any other countries.
Threats 'from' space systems
While the counterspace capabilities listed above describe current threats 'to' space systems, there is another challenge that features often in space security
talks, namely threats 'from' space systems.
These are different because rather than targeting space objects, these
capabilities would be able to target objects in the atmosphere or on the
ground. At present, no country has ever even hinted at plans to deploy such
weapons, except the US.
In the 1980s, then-US President Ronald Reagan launched an initiative called
Star Wars, which consisted of satellites with missile interceptors that could
destroy ICBMs in orbit. This idea has long been refuted as being about as
technically or economically feasible as deploying 'pink dragons' in space.
Nevertheless, space-based missile interceptors are being discussed by the US
once again, albeit at a very superficial level. The concern here is that
space-based missile defence is a pretext to deploy missiles that can strike
surface targets. And while many experts cite the extreme remoteness of the
possibility of such a weapon system ever being deployed, the mere perception of
a threat is creating real challenges in multilateral discussions.
Multilateral efforts to mitigate threats
UN member states acknowledged the growing challenges to space security decades
ago, yet there is little progress on this issue. States are generally divided
into two camps. Some (mostly Western, developed states) are concerned about
threats 'to' their space systems, and want voluntary measures to provide
transparency in space. This includes measures like launch notifications,
sharing orbital data and publishing national space policies.
Others (led by Russia and China but also including most of the rest of the
world), are not opposed to voluntary measures but would prefer to see a treaty,
which is legally binding. These states are also concerned by the possibility
(albeit still a remote one) that someone might one day put weapons in space
that can threaten people on the ground. For these states, only a legally
binding instrument will suffice.
For the moment, there does not seem to be much room for consensus. The two
camps in space security discussions continue to hold firm on their positions.
One option for moving forward might be to focus on specific issues that affect
all, such as the testing of destructive anti-satellite technology that creates
debris.
However, more ambitious solutions will likely continue to be out of reach,
particularly if space-based missile defence continues to feature in the
background of multilateral discussions without being directly addressed.
Daniel A. Porras is a fellow for space security at the United Nations
Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).